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This case study is part of the CEPS project ‘Climate for Sustainable Growth’, whose main objective is to 
analyse the impacts of climate change mitigation measures on the three pillars of sustainable 
development: the economic, environmental and social dimensions.  
It does so by looking at the positive as well as negative, both intended and unintended, impacts of 
climate change mitigation policies and projects. While this case study fully recognizes that policies have 
both positive and negative impacts, the focus of is on (potential) negative impacts of climate change 
mitigation policies.  
The structure of this case study comprises of four sections:  
(1) Sector characteristics,  
(2) Climate-related policies,  
(3) Environmental, social and economic impacts of climate mitigation policies,  
(4) Measures to mitigate impacts of mitigation policies, 
This case study, and the methodology it follows, are not intended to analyse the merit of the policies 
and measures that are being implemented, or their effectiveness and efficiency, but will focus on their 
socio-economic-environmental impacts, and measures to alleviate these impacts in the period of 
transition.  
It is important to note that lack of information and analysis of impacts and tools to mitigate negative 
impacts can act as a brake on ambitious climate action. This case study and the overall project’s focus 
should be seen in this light. 
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Executive Summary  
This study, which is part of the project entitled “Climate for Sustainable Growth“, focuses on 
one particular policy tool used in the agricultural sector, food labelling. It reviews food carbon 
labelling when put in place with clear objectives to address climate change.  
This study examines whether food carbon labels, as climate mitigation tools, are put in place in a 
sustainable way, by identifying their impacts on the three dimensions of sustainable 
development: 1) economic 2) social and 3) environmental.  
This case study examines both domestic, as well as international (in other jurisdictions) impacts 
of food labelling, and then focuses on the measures that are put in place to mitigate the 
(potential) negative impacts identified. While domestic impacts of food labelling can be 
addressed through safety nets that exist in jurisdictions that introduce food labelling (e.g. the 
EU), the case study also discusses international tools and safety nets available in that 
jurisdiction, as well as internationally.  
Given the broad scope of the topic, this study sets boundaries through the selection of a limited 
number of food labels. These policies have general environmental objectives, but also target, 
directly or indirectly, climate change. This study looks at: 
 Cocoa labelling in Ghana (Rainforest Alliance, UTZ, organic and FairTrade labels)  
 The Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) production and  
 The EU’s efforts towards a product environmental footprint (not strictly a labelling 
regime, but closely related).  
It finds that food labels have both positive and negative impacts on the three dimensions of 
sustainable development. Most impacts were positive, and this is to be expected given the 
public welfare objectives that drive the underlying policies. 
Firstly, in a national context in Ghana, cocoa labelling has had wide-ranging impacts. Cocoa 
labelling has had unintended economic impacts by favouring large cocoa producers at the 
expense of small producers. On the other hand, smallholders have increasingly started selling 
cocoa via cooperatives which has generated positive economic impacts by providing producers 
who joined Rainforest Alliance, Fairtrade and UTZ certification e.g. with better access to credit 
as well as an increase in income (a net return of $225/tonne). Perhaps the most important 
economic impact has been increased productivity, which is the result of the necessary producer 
training in good agricultural practices. Increased productivity actually tends to be more 
significant than price premiums for increasing incomes. 
Training in good agricultural practices also created positive social and environmental impacts 
(e.g. trained producers scored better in proper use of toxic chemicals, such as pesticides and 
fungicides, and used smaller doses of chemicals than non-trained producers). Further evidence 
of positive environmental impacts of cocoa labelling in Ghana was found as certified producers 
(Rainforest Alliance), were, for example, more likely to have at least one soil conservation 
measure in place (43%) in comparison to non-certified producers (5%).  
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Secondly, this study finds that the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) production has 
both positive and negative impacts at international level. The main positive economic impact, 
and the aim of the regime, is preservation of market share for palm oil in the face of negative 
public views of the supply chain. RSPO also creates other positive economic impacts, e.g. by 
contributing to quality improvement and productivity, as producers are forced to implement 
good practices of production, harvest, handling and management. Also, premiums of RSPO 
certified palm oil (ranging from zero to $30 per tonne) are a clear positive economic impact.  
On the other hand, the RSPO can favour large producers at the expense of SMEs who need 
training and capacity-building in order to understand the standards and comply with them. 
Unintended economic impacts, although difficult to quantify, might also occur e.g. from RSPO’s 
requirement to limit the types of land on which palm oil production can expand. Since this 
would arguably limit supply, the cost of palm oil can contribute to food insecurity for consumers 
in particular in South- and South-East Asia (who account for roughly 60% of global imports).  
This study also finds positive and negative social impacts of RSPO production. As palm oil is a 
particularly labour-intensive crop, it creates more jobs than its closest substitutes (soybean oil 
and rapeseed oil). Therefore maintenance of market share for palm oil, which is linked to RSPO 
certification, has contributes in a positive manner to livelihood and poverty alleviation. On the 
other hand, the possible decrease in food security has a negative social impact. 
This study finds that RSPO production can have positive and negative environmental impacts. 
The most significant impacts relate to standards that discourage clearing of peat swamp-land for 
cultivation. If the elements in RSPO’s 2013 revised principles and criteria (which have not yet 
entered into force) are followed strictly, they will lead to significant GHG emissions reductions.  
RSPO production can also limit clearing of primary forests and biodiversity loss since it e.g. 
prohibits clearing of “high conservation value” (HCV) land. On the other hand, RSPO production 
may have negative environmental impacts, if it is true (as alleged) that RSPO members regularly 
cheat on their commitments. This would mean that the existence of the RSPO would have 
negative impacts, since if it did not exist there would at least be more openness about the 
nature of the transgressions. 
Thirdly, positive and negative impacts are found as a result of the EU’s efforts towards product 
environmental footprinting (PEF). In this example, however, fewer impacts on the three 
dimensions (economic, social and environmental) of sustainable development are identified, 
since this regime is still in a pilot phase.  
The main contribution of a harmonised regime of product environmental footprinting would be 
a greater ability for green goods producers to sell into markets which, in the absence of a 
harmonised standard, would have a costly variety of differing standards. If this were to evolve 
and become mandatory, however, a harmonised regime could hurt small producers for whom it 
is more difficult to meet these standards. Goods that rely on many small producers at the base 
of the value chain (like cocoa, palm oil, shrimp, rice and other major developing country agri-
food exports) would tend to suffer disproportionately. 
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This case study finds that flanking measures were put in place to mitigate the negative impacts 
of food labels studied. Domestically in Ghana, negative economic impacts on small producers 
(cocoa labelling in Ghana) were mitigated with intensive training and capacity building. In the 
case of RSPO, a RSPO Smallholder Support Fund was put in place 2013, recognising the special 
challenges faced by smallholders (defined as 50 hectares or less) in the palm oil sector at 
international level. Similar funds might further mitigate the impacts of food labels, and special 
rules or institutions for SMEs might be established offering e.g. simplified verification to small 
producers.  
Ultimately it is impossible to mitigate the negative impacts of climate-related food labels if 
those impacts are not known. An efficient way to better understand these sorts of impacts is to 
ask affected parties to come forward with their input, both during the process of formulating 
the standards and on an ongoing basis. The EU’s PEF programme has engaged with a broad 
range of relevant stakeholders in its current phase, though it could do more to reach out to 
foreign producers. To understand the impact of their schemes, UTZ and Rainforest Alliance have 
used an objective non-governmental organisation, COSA, to conduct public and critical 
assessments of their impacts. 
This case study finds that food labels in the agricultural sector have impacts not only in their 
intended target area, but also in other facets of public policy – economic, social and 
environmental. Beyond the lessons learned specific to the food labelling case, the analysis here 
supports the notion that any climate change policies should be carefully assessed for their 
broader sustainable development impacts, domestically and internationally, both in their initial 
elaboration, as well as on an ongoing basis. 
It must be emphasized that this discussion must not be in any way be interpreted or construed 
as encouraging lack of mitigation action. On the contrary, it must be seen as providing a way 
forward that will ensure that action can be undertaken with full support by all stakeholders, 
domestic and international. 
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 Sector Characteristics 
 Economic characteristics of the sector 
Agriculture is one of the most economically important sectors globally, occupying a significant 
share of global gross domestic product (GDP), engaging a disproportionate share of developing 
country workers, and constituting one of the most important single traded sectors of 
merchandise goods.1 
Figure 1 shows agricultural value-added in current (2005) USD, showing the equivalent of 
roughly 2.2 trillion USD globally as of 2013.2  In terms of share of GDP, value added in agriculture 
globally constitutes 3% of GDP.3  But that figure embodies a wide range of values, from 1% in 
North America and 2% in OECD countries to 19% in South Asia and 14% in developing sub-
Saharan Africa.4  Figure 2 shows the distribution across low-, middle- and high-income countries, 
illustrating that dependence on agriculture is almost 20 times higher in low-income than in high-
income countries. In absolute terms, developing countries produce most of the world’s 
agricultural products, generating roughly three-quarters of global agricultural value added (FAO, 
2012). 
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1 The agricultural sector typically includes cultivation of food crops, fisheries and forestry.  Where possible 
in this document, forestry is excluded from the analysis and statistics presented. 
2 The USD 2.2 million figure is current dollars.  For this reason the graph, which is in 2005 dollars, seems to 
read less than this total. 
3 World Development Indicators, 2013 figures. 
4 Ibid. 
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Figure 1. Global Agricultural Value Added, USD billions ($2005) 
Source: World Development Indicators
Figure 2.  Agricultural value added as % of GDP, 2012 
 
Source: World Development Indicators database 
Agriculture’s employment impacts are much larger than might be indicated by its share of GDP. 
Of the more than 3 billion people that live in rural areas globally, roughly 2.5 billion of those 
derive their livelihoods from agriculture, and globally that figure is roughly one-third of the 
world’s population (Ibid). Those impacts are particularly important to the poor; for the more 
than 70% of the world’s poor who live in rural areas, agriculture is the main source of income 
and employment (World Bank, n.d.). Exports are particularly important to some crops and 
countries; in 1999, in 28 developing countries, 3 or fewer agricultural export commodities 
accounted for over 40% of total merchandise exports (FAO 2002, Table 1). In fact, a single 
commodity accounted for more than 50% of total merchandise export earnings in four 
countries: Burundi (coffee, 75%), Niue (Taro, 71%), Sao Thomé and Principe (cocoa, 69%) and 
Ethiopia (coffee, 62%) (Ibid). 
Most food consumed is produced domestically.  Nonetheless, agriculture is a highly traded 
sector. Food exports in 2013, at over USD 1.5 trillion, stood at just under 9% of total global 
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merchandise trade (World Development Indicators), and trade flows of agricultural goods have 
increased fivefold in real terms over the last 50 years (FAO, 2014:150).  
Figure 3 ranks the top 15 categories of food exports (by value) in 2013. Palm oil, which is 
covered in this paper, is a major component of the fats and oils group, ranked 6th largest in trade 
volumes. Cocoa, which is also covered, is ranked 15th. Figure 4 shows food export values for the 
top 15 global exporters for the same year, six of which are developing countries (namely Brazil, 
China, India, Argentina, Indonesia and Thailand). 
Figure 3. Top Food Export, 2013 (USD millions)  
Source: UN COMTRADE Database 
Figure 4. Top Food Exporters, 2013 (USD millions) 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE Database 
Many emerging economies are increasingly successful in exporting higher value added 
agricultural products such as semi-processed foods. The global value of developing countries’ 
fish exports – a relatively high value-added product – for example, now exceeds that of the 
more traditional commodity-like exports: coffee, tea, cocoa, bananas and sugar (Ibid, p. 154). 
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But the path to this sort of export success is not easy.  FAO (2014:156) notes, in a passage that 
sets the context well for the present study: 
“The prospects for developing countries to benefit substantially from international 
trade depend on several complex factors. Increasing product differentiation, safety 
requirements and concerns about the carbon footprints of products are likely to 
bring about significant compliance costs for exporters. For developing countries, 
access to foreign markets may demand increased investments; and policies for 
promoting exports will need to look well beyond tariffs and subsidies towards the 
establishment of standards and producers’ networks.” 
Food labelling initiatives touch precisely upon this need for increased product differentiation 
and higher standards, including the carbon content of food exports. That brings us to the 
climate impacts of the agricultural sector, discussed in the next section. 
 Main climate impacts of the sector 
Agriculture is an important contributor to anthropogenic climate change. Estimates vary 
depending on assumptions about scope, but IPCC (2014) conservatively calculates the overall 
agricultural contribution to anthropogenic GHG emissions between 17% and 20%. This figure is 
made up of 10-12% non-CO2 emissions, and 7.4% CO2 emissions. FAO (2014:220) cites a larger 
figure, estimating agriculture is responsible for up to 30% of anthropogenic GHG emissions. 
Figure 5 shows the major sources of agriculture-related non-CO2 GHG emissions. These are 
chiefly emissions of methane, mostly through enteric fermentation and manure management, 
and N2O, mostly from manure management and the production of synthetic fertiliser. 
Agriculture was the largest single producer of non-CO2 emissions in 2005, at 56% (IPCC op. cit.).  
Agriculture’s CO2 emissions derive primarily from deforestation and peat swamp conversion. 
Undisturbed waterlogged peat lands (also called organic soils) contain a large amount of carbon 
that is released into the atmosphere (along with some N2O) when it is exposed to oxygen 
through drainage for agriculture. Emissions from this source amounted to 0.9 Gt of carbon 
dioxide equivalent (CO2e)/year in 2010, with the largest share coming from Asia (0.44 
GtCO2e/year).5 Deforestation is also a major source of CO2 emissions, with emissions from land 
use change and forestry larger than those from all agriculture-related non-CO2 sources 
combined, though it is difficult to separate out emissions associated with forestry from 
emissions associated with agriculture. 
  
                                                          
5 FAOSTAT database. 
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Figure 5.  Non-CO₂ GHG Agricultural Emissions 
 
 
Source:  FAO Statistical Yearbook 2013, Table 49 
 
 Other impacts of the sector 
Agriculture also has other environmental impacts. MEA (2005) cites land clearing and conversion 
for agriculture as the single most important cause of biodiversity loss. Excess and run-off 
fertiliser from agriculture is also responsible for eutrophication of fresh water systems, and dead 
zones of oxygen-starved ocean water where rivers deposit large quantities of such run-off into 
the sea. Finally, the pesticides, herbicides and fungicides used in many agricultural models 
(primarily practised intensively in developed countries) may have deleterious effects on human 
health and the health of the ecosystems in which the crops are grown. 
Organic production systems avoid these last two problems by prohibiting the use of synthetic 
fertilisers and chemical pesticides, fungicides and herbicides. Some organic standards also 
prohibit clearing of land of high biodiversity value for the express purpose of agricultural 
production.  
As noted above, agriculture also has significant social and economic impacts, acting as it does as 
a major employer of low-income low-skill labour, especially in rural areas. It also provides food 
security for those same rural cultivators where food, as opposed to export crops, are grown. 
 Food Labelling 
 Context 
This study focuses on one particular policy tool used in the agricultural sector as a way to 
achieve climate change objectives: food labelling, and specifically food labels for climate 
objectives. 
Food labels are a subset of a larger group of policy tools known as ecolabels.  These are tools to 
give the buyer of a labelled good information about the impacts inherent in the way the good is 
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produced, used and disposed of.  Some focus on the entire life cycle of the labelled good, from 
extraction of the basic materials to final disposal.  Others – for example, organic labels that 
cover only production – focus only on one particular phase. Those geared at conveying 
information on climate change for the most part focus on the CO2 equivalent emissions released 
over the product’s life cycle, or the product carbon footprint. 
Ecolabels at one time were a niche market, but in recent years and in selected commodities they 
are becoming decidedly mainstream, assuming a growing segment of global markets.  Potts et 
al. (2014) survey 16 global standards across 10 major commodities (8 of which are food and 
beverage) and estimate a global traded value of $31.6 billion in 2012. The global market share of 
standards-compliant products for some of these commodities is as high as 40%. 
The point of such labels is to encourage environmentally friendly practices by using market 
forces – consumer preference – to favour goods with a lighter footprint.  The labels examined 
here are varied in their scope, but all of them give the consumer some information that is 
relevant to the final product’s impact on climate change. 
The vast majority of ecolabels require that the producer obtains third party certification that its 
good meets the criteria established by the labelling regime. The certifier will typically be 
formally accredited by the regime to perform such certifications. The certified good is then 
allowed to display the regime’s label on its packaging. Often, such schemes will involve regular 
(e.g., annual) recertification. 
There are a number of variations on the basic theme of ecolabels.  The most important defining 
distinction comes in answer to the question: why is the producer seeking certification and 
labelling?  This might be because the label is a condition of sale, or it might be because the 
producer is seeking to distinguish the labelled good from other non-labelled goods. 
2.1.1. Labels as a condition of sale 
There are two types of scenarios under which the ecolabel is a condition of sale, and they can be 
distinguished by who is demanding the label.  In the first scenario, the demanding party is a 
retailer that has pledged to sell only goods that are labelled. These might be simple pass/fail 
labels which, like the labels on organic food, simply tell the consumer whether the product is 
compliant with a standard. Or they might be labels that give the consumer a relative measure of 
how well the product stacks up against other goods in its class – a relative measurement label 
that, for example, tells the consumer that a given washing machine is in the 50th percentile of all 
washing machines for energy efficiency, or tells the consumer how much carbon is embodied in 
a product, allowing for product-to-product comparisons.  
B&Q, the world’s fourth largest do-it-yourself retail chain, in 2011 attained 100% sourcing of 
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certified wood for all wood and wooden products (a pass/fail 
type label).  Any producer wanting to sell its products to B&Q must, as a condition of sale, be 
able to show that the wood from which its products are made is FSC certified.  There have been 
a number of attempts to elaborate relative measurement type labels, by retail giants like Tesco, 
Walmart and Carrefour; most of these were aimed at communicating the level of embodied 
carbon in a product.   
7 
One ill-fated example of such labels is food miles labels.  In 2010 Tesco began labelling its 
produce with a tally of how many miles it had flown to get to the UK. Other retailers such as 
Marks and Spencer followed suit. But a storm of criticism followed the introduction of these 
labels (See, for example, Desrocher and Shimizu (2008); Zaino (2008); Muller (2007). MacGregor 
(2010)). Weber and Matthews (2008) found that transport emissions are only a small part of the 
total life cycle emissions associated with food at the point of purchase, with transport from 
producer to retailer averaging 4% of total embodied emissions over the life cycle. Ultimately, 
how a good is produced and stored is much more important from a climate change perspective 
than how far and by what mode it was transported to market (though air freight is much more 
emissions-intensive than shipping). No food miles labels exist today. 
 Summary on taxonomy of ecolabels 
 
Labels as a condition of sale 
 Standard type 
Pass/fail Relative 
Retailer specifies: 
product category X must 
be labelled 
B&Q (UK): All wood products must 
be FSC-certified  
Walmart: All own-brand food 
suppliers must certify to GlobalGap 
or other similar standard 
Tesco (discontinued): selected 
products must display carbon 
emissions per unit, using Carbon 
Trust label 
Government specifies: 
product category X must 
be labelled 
This policy would amount to a ban 
on products not meeting the 
standard, and labels for those that 
do. No such policies in place. 
Canada's EnerGuide: selected 
consumer products must be 
labelled  with rating on a spectrum 
of energy efficiency performance 
Labels as a distinguishing feature 
Standard created by 
government or national 
standards body 
National certified organic standards 
National ecolabel schemes (e.g., Nordic Swan, Singapore Green Label, 
German Blue Angel) 
EnergyStar: created by US Environmental Protection agency to label 
consumer goods 
Standard created by 
NGO or NGO/private 
consortium 
Marine Stewardship Council: created by WWF and Unilever to certify 
sustainably harvested fish 
Max Havelaar Foundation: Fair trade label for agricultural products 
Rainforest Alliance: created by social activist founders to address 
deforestation 
Standard created by 
producers 
Bonsucro, Brazil: sugar producers' standard of sustainable practice 
RSPO: initially created by palm oil producers 
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The second scenario is a government labelling regime requiring that all products in a given class 
must be labelled in order to be sold in the domestic market.  Again, the label might be either a 
pass/fail test, or a relative declaration of how the product fares against its competitors. The first 
type of label is a requirement that all products in a certain class should pass some standard, and 
be labelled as in compliance, in order to be sold in the domestic market. There are many 
examples of this sort of label in the area of safety standards for consumer products, but none 
exists in the area of food. An example of the second type of label is the Canadian EnerGuide 
label, which informs potential buyers of the energy efficiency of most major appliances, and 
shows how they perform relative to the range of such appliances on the market.6  All covered 
appliances must be labelled to be sold in the Canadian retail market.  In the area of food there 
are no such standards in place, although the report that followed France’s environmental 
labelling pilot scheme recommended a broader scheme that would start as voluntary and would 
eventually transition to mandatory (Ernst & Young, n.d.).  
2.1.2. Labels as a distinguishing feature 
Many labelling regimes are not required as a condition of sale, but rather are used by producers 
to distinguish their goods from unlabelled goods which, presumably, have a worse 
environmental performance across the life cycle. 
There are three major scenarios that distinguish labelling regimes of this sort, and they hinge on 
who is writing the rules of the label – who creates the standard?  
Some schemes are the product of a governmental or inter-governmental standard setting body, 
or a body specifically mandated by a national government to produce the standard. An example 
of this latter type of scheme is the EU ecolabel, which producers voluntarily apply for so as to 
help boost their sales with eco-conscious consumers.7  The British Standards Association (BSA) 
produced the PAS 2050 which describes standards for a suite of consumer goods (mostly foods) 
based on carbon content. Many national governments have mandated their standards setting 
bodies or agricultural ministries to create organic standards, and to accredit certifiers to the 
standard. 
Others are the product of an independent effort by non-governmental organisations. The 
Rainforest Alliance, for example, is a non-governmental organization (NGO) devoted to halting 
rainforest destruction through market forces.  It allows agricultural products (among other 
things) to bear its certified seal if they pass the requisite standards.  The Marine Stewardship 
Council, which certifies sustainably harvested fish products, was originally a joint effort led by 
WWF in partnership with Unilever, created in response to the collapse of the North American 
Grand Banks cod fishery. 
Others are largely spearheaded by a cooperative effort on the part of producers, seeking to 
assert that their products are credible as environmentally friendly (or at least more so than 
others in their product category).  The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, for example, was 
                                                          
6 For details see http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/products/energuide/13592. 
7 For details see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/index_en.htm.  
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initially founded by producers seeking to counter negative publicity about their product, though 
it now involves a much wider range of actors along the supply chain. 
Most ecolabelling regimes are voluntary schemes under which producers ultimately choose 
whether or not to be certified. There are presently very few examples of purely mandatory 
schemes, wherein governments condition market access on obtaining an ecolabel, and there are 
none at all in the food sector. That said, the distinction between voluntary and mandatory is not 
always clear cut. If a retailer demands the label as a condition of sale, is that mandatory or 
voluntary? It is true that the producer has the choice not to be labelled, and to sell to other 
buyers, so in that sense it is voluntary.  But what if the retailer is a significant part of the global 
buying market? Similarly, does a voluntary government label become less voluntary if 
consumers overwhelmingly choose goods that are labelled over those that are not? This is a set 
of issues that will be discussed in greater depth later in this paper. 
2.1.3. Labels, standards and WTO law 
It should be noted that the voluntary/mandatory distinction is important from a legal 
perspective. Food labels and the standards on which they are based are covered under the 
WTO’s Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, and the legal obligations are quite different for 
voluntary and mandatory efforts. 
While the distinctions are not always straightforward, one thing is clear: when a government 
decrees that a label, or certification to a standard, is a condition of sale in its domestic market, it 
is bound by the TBT Agreement to a number of procedural obligations, including obligations of 
transparency, technical assistance, and – importantly – the need to ensure that the standard is 
not more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve the legitimate objective at which it aims.8 
However, if the standard is a condition of sale to a private sector actor, it is not considered 
mandatory under WTO law, and is not covered by these obligations. 
Voluntary standards are covered under an annex to the TBT: The Code of Good Practice for the 
Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards. The Code is less onerous than the TBT 
Agreement’s obligations for mandatory standards, and does not contain a not-more-trade-
restrictive requirement, but does have procedural requirements that aim for best practice in 
standard-setting. 
It is not, however, clear who exactly is covered by the Code. The Code is open for voluntary 
acceptance by practically any sort of standardizing body, and member governments must 
ensure that their central government standardizing bodies are in compliance, but beyond that it 
gets vague. The TBT requires that members “shall take such reasonable measures as may be 
available to them to ensure that local government and non-governmental standardizing bodies 
within their territories, as well as regional standardizing bodies of which they or one or more 
bodies within their territories are members, accept and comply” with the Code. But it is not clear 
                                                          
8 In WTO terms such a standard is known as a technical regulation, while all other “less mandatory” 
regimes are known as standards. We will not use those terms in this discussion, since they are not so used 
in the rest of this paper. 
10 
what force governments might have to make international organizations such as Rainforest 
Alliance and the Forest Stewardship Council abide by TBT law, even if it were obvious in what 
country’s territory they were based. As well, while it does seem clear that private retailers are 
not standardizing bodies within the definition offered by the TBT, there has been plenty of 
discussion within the WTO’s Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade on whether and how 
such retailers might be subjected to the Code of Good Practice, given the significant impacts 
their practices can have on exporters. 
 Why focus on food labels? 
There are many tools available to policy-makers looking to address climate change concerns in 
the agricultural sector, with food carbon labels being only one. Domingo et al. (2014) list other 
sorts of policies, including: 
 Restrictions on land clearing, conversion; 
 Regulations on treatment of animal waste (methane minimisation); 
 Incentives, capacity building to alter practices (e.g., incentives for conservation 
agriculture (no-till), for altered livestock feed, for bio-gas capture, for leguminous plant 
cultivation & planting of cover crops, for crop switching, etc.); 
 Reduced subsidies for GHG-related inputs such as fossil fuels, nitrogen fertiliser. 
Food carbon labels, however, have a number of characteristics that make them a particularly 
appropriate focus for this study. 
For one thing, labelling is a demand-side tool, unlike the supply-side tools described above. As 
such, its impacts are felt through altered patterns of consumption, meaning it will have direct 
impacts on international trade flows (where production is traded). Given the aim of this project 
– to look at international impacts of climate policies – this characteristic makes it an ideal focus 
for study. 
Furthermore, the evidence is that food labels have a significant potential to influence consumer 
behaviour, with attendant significant impacts (both positive and negative). Food tends to make 
up a high percentage of consumer purchases, even in more affluent countries (INSEE 2011).  And 
it is often the most frequently purchased item – bought on an almost daily basis, meaning 
frequent contact with labelling information. Moreover, demand for food is relatively inelastic, 
meaning that even when their income changes, people do not respond by changing significantly 
the amount they spend on food.  
Food products are strongly represented in consumer labelling schemes, as well.  Ecolabels tend 
to focus on goods for sale to final consumers, and a major portion of them tend to be food 
items.  Potts et al (2014) surveys the state of 16 of the most widely used global voluntary 
sustainability standards, and the coverage is almost all food products: bananas, cocoa, coffee, 
palm oil, soy, sugar or tea.  Only three commodities covered were not food items: cotton, forest 
products and biofuels. When BSA propounded its first set of standards on product carbon 
footprints, (PSA 2050), the coverage was similarly almost exclusively food items. Fully 70 of the 
168 companies participating in the pilot for environmental labelling in France (under the 
Grenelle II from 2011 – 2012) were from the agri-food sector.  
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Moreover, survey results show that consumers are affected by labels. An EU study (Gallup, 
2009) found that 47% of respondents claimed that ecolabels played an important role in their 
purchasing decisions, and fully 72% supported mandatory product carbon footprint labelling. 
Bolwig and Gibbon (2010) studies  US and UK consumers and found that over half of them 
would rather do business with a company that was striving to reduce its carbon footprint, and 
almost two-thirds of UK consumers want companies to provide more information on their 
products’ carbon footprints. Carbon Trust (2009) found that 67% of UK consumers buy lower 
carbon products, and 44% of them would switch to purchase a lower carbon product even if it 
were not otherwise their first choice. That said, most surveys find price to be more important 
than environmental qualities; Bolwig and Gibbon (op. cit.) found the environmental factors 
ranked third after price and quality in the minds of consumers, and found carbon footprint 
ranked third in the list of important environmental criteria. 
That sort of response has seen food labels take on an increasingly important role in determining 
market share.  From a niche segment of the market even a decade ago, food labels for some 
products have now developed into significant global segments of demand. Table 1 shows that 
the global market share of coffee conforming to voluntary sustainability standards rose from 
15% in 2008 to 40% in 2012 – a compound annual growth rate of 28%.  For cocoa, the 
corresponding figures were 3% to 22%, or a 65% compound annual increase. Standard-
compliant palm oil rose from 2% of the global market to 15% – also a 65% annual increase.  As 
noted above, Potts et al. (2014) survey 16 global standards across 10 major commodities and 
estimate a global traded value of $31.6 billion in 2012. 
Table 1. Growth in global market share of labelled goods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Potts et al., 2014 
 The labels 
This study looks at three case studies of food labels with carbon relevance.  They are: 
 Cocoa labelling in Ghana (Rainforest Alliance, UTZ, organic and FairTrade labels) 
 The Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) production 
 The EU efforts toward product environmental footprinting 
 Market 
share 2008 
Market 
share 2012 
Increase 
 in share 
Annual  
growth rate 
Coffee 15% 40% 167% 28% 
Cocoa 3% 22% 633% 65% 
Palm Oil 2% 15% 650% 65% 
Tea 6% 12% 100% 19% 
Bananas 2% 3% 50% 11% 
12 
These three cases offer a good contextual diversity.  The cocoa labels are all non-governmental 
voluntary standards aimed at distinguishing the goods in question.  The RSPO is voluntary and 
was originally a producer-driven standard aimed at establishing credibility (Laurance et al., 
2010). And the EU effort – which is a footprinting exercise that does not involve a label, but 
which constitutes the basis on which labels could be established – is government-driven, in 
collaboration with retailers and producers, with the possibility of becoming mandatory at some 
point in the future. All have, on the face of it, good potential for international impacts, and 
useful lessons on the broader impacts of climate-related measures. 
2.3.1. Cocoa labels 
This case looks specifically at cocoa labels used in Ghana. Framing the context within a specific 
country allows for a greater level of depth in the analysis. And Ghana as a choice of countries 
makes good sense, given the significance of cocoa to the national economy (see also the country 
case study on Ghana as part of this CEPS project).   
After Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana is the world’s second largest producer of cocoa, and is widely 
acknowledged to be the world’s top producer in terms of quality. Cocoa is Ghana’s chief 
agricultural export, and its main cash crop, with exports accounting for 11% of total 
merchandise exports in 2013,9 and 3% of GDP (direct share).10  Those statistics understate the 
contribution of the cocoa sector to the national economy, however; Laven (2010:23) estimates 
that ultimately the livelihoods of some 6.3 million Ghanaians (roughly one-third of the 
population) depend on cocoa. 
The structure of production sees roughly a million producers, mostly smallholders, at the base of 
the value chain, often selling through producers’ cooperatives (Laven and Boomsma, 2012:7). 
Potts et al. (2014) note that in Ghana only one percent of cocoa farms are larger than five 
hectares. Most producers are poor, with small plots of land (median size around 3 hectares, as 
per Bethge (2014:67)) and limited means to invest in improving the existing low productivity 
(Laven and Boomsma op. cit.).  Interest rates to these producers – where they can obtain credit 
–is at crippling rates; Deppeler, Fromm and Aidoo (2014) found a mean rate of 82%, with more 
than half of respondents paying 100% per annum. Often credit is supplied in the form of lent 
inputs such as fertiliser, provided by buyers. 
From those sellers the product is purchased by only a few buyers. Until 1992 the Ghana Cocoa 
Board (COCOBOD), was the only allowed buyer and exporter, controlling quality, prices and 
external marketing.  More recently, Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs) have been allowed to 
purchase, and in some cases export, cocoa products, but price and quality are still set by 
COCOBOD. As of 2012 nine LBCs accounted for around 95% of the market (CEval, 2012).  
International buyers are similarly few, with almost 50% of the global confectionary market 
controlled by just five global firms (Kraft, Mars, Nestlé, Hershey’s and Ferrero). And finally, from 
very few buyers/processors the product is sold as a commodity for further refinement, or a 
processed finished product, to a large number of retail-level buyers. 
                                                          
9 UNCTAD COMTRADE database. 
10 Derived by author from Ibid, and World Bank World Development Indicators database. 
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Ghana’s cocoa production is on average of very low productivity, with few or no inputs, and an 
ageing stock of trees. KPMG (2012) notes that low margins in turn tend to mean low ability to 
invest in upgrading of productivity. Producers tend to be older, with little or no education. The 
majority of cocoa growers produce roughly an equal value of food crops for personal 
consumption and cocoa for sale (CEval, op. cit.). 
Until recently there had been a considerable shift in cultivated area from the southeast of 
Ghana to the west, to the so-called High Forest Zone (HFZ). This trend mostly consisted of the 
clearing of new land from the Western forests – a practice that producers found easier than 
investing in replanting when their trees became old, or increasing productivity on existing lands. 
The predominant mode of production in the HFZ has been extensive forest clearing, in what is 
known as low- or no-shade cocoa cultivation. This system of cultivation can deliver higher yields 
on a short-term basis, provided sufficient inputs of water and fertilizers, but in the absence of 
those inputs those higher yields are temporary, based on unsustainable use of the forest soil 
fertility. Given that most coca farmers are not using fertilizers, the final result is low productivity 
coupled with high rates of deforestation. 
Clearly this had major implications for climate change and biodiversity.  Conservation 
International (2008) estimated at that time that 1.3% of Ghana’s remaining forests were being 
lost each year due to unsustainable cocoa cultivation. More recently this trend has been greatly 
diminished by well-enforced laws against forest encroachment, incentives for investment in 
productivity and better training in good agricultural practice (World Bank 2011). But as of 2014 a 
high-level group of technical experts from the forestry and cocoa sectors still identified 
encroachment of low/no shade cocoa systems and associated food crops into protected forests 
as one of the primary drivers of deforestation in Ghana (Government of Ghana, 2014).  
There has been increasing attention to the goals of sustainability in the cocoa value chain. At the 
time of writing Mars Inc., Mondeléz International, Nestlé, Ferraro and Hershey (together 
comprising over 50% of the confectionary market) have pledged to source 100% certified 
sustainable cocoa by 2020. 
A significant share of Ghana’s cocoa crop is standards-compliant.  As noted above, cocoa is one 
of the fastest growing commodities to be grown under global standards, with compound annual 
growth of over 25% between 2008 and 2012. In Ghana in 2011-2012, 16% of the total crop was 
compliant with one of the four standards covered here (see Figure 6). UTZ is the major player, 
followed by Rainforest Alliance, with FairTrade at a lesser rate and organic holding a very small 
market share.  
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Figure 6. Standard-compliant cocoa, Ghana (2011-2012) 
 
Source: Potts et al. 
The four schemes have very different criteria, as each aims at different objectives in practice, 
but each has some elements that mean they ultimately do address climate change to differing 
extents. 
UTZ 
UTZ publishes “Good Inside” codes of conduct for specific covered crops, and has a standard 
specific to cocoa.  Version 1 (April 2009), which is the most up-to-date as of this writing, has 
seven chapters in areas such as social responsibility and product flow control, and 172 “control 
points”, or criteria. Each chapter specifies how many of the criteria must be fulfilled, with the 
totals varying to allow incremental improvements over the first four years of certification. 
The most significant impacts on climate change will come from UTZ’s criteria related to chapter 
3: Natural Resources and Biodiversity. Section 3.C (Forest and Biodiversity) contains the 
following two control points: 
 99.  Degradation and deforestation of primary forest is prohibited. There has been no 
such degradation and/or deforestation since 2008. 
 100.  There is no degradation or deforestation of forest that has not been used for 
agriculture in the past 20 years or more (i.e., that are older than 20 years), after 
initiating the certification process. This does not refer to timber plantations. 
As noted above, agriculture’s main impacts on climate change derive from deforestation and 
forest degradation. As such these criteria, which seek to reduce those pressures, are significant, 
especially in light of the sector’s structure. Poor producers are unable to invest in productivity 
and rehabilitation, and World Bank (2011) notes that increased yields in Ghana have come 
almost exclusively from extensification of the growing area. 
  
7.6%
4.5%
0.2 %
9.8%
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Rainforest Alliance 
The Rainforest Alliance standard is maintained by the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN), a 
group that Rainforest Alliance helped establish. There is no specific cocoa standard, but rather a 
more general Sustainable Agricultural Standard (farm standard, version 3, July 2010).  Certifiers 
are trained to decide which of the various criteria is applicable to the specific context in which 
they are working at any given time. Farms are certified at the level of whole operation, even if 
more than one crop is produced. The minimum score an operation must achieve to be certified 
is 80% of criteria successfully passed, and continuous improvement over time is expected. 
SAN’s Sustainable Agricultural Standard has 10 principles (e.g., Ecosystem Conservation, Fair 
Treatment and Good Working conditions for Workers, Integrated Crop Management, etc.), each 
of which is divided into numerous criteria. Sixteen of those are designated “critical criteria”, 
meaning they must be successfully obtained regardless of the 80% score test.  
The following criteria are those most relevant to climate change: 
 1.11: The farm must do an annual inventory of energy used on farm by source and 
process. It must have an energy efficiency plan with goals for increased efficiency and 
reduced dependence on non-renewable sources. Use of on-farm energy sources is 
preferred. 
 2.2. (critical criterion): From date of certification, the farm must not destroy any natural 
ecosystem. Additionally, if any high value ecosystem has been destroyed on the farm 
site since 2005, a number of mitigation measures must be undertaken. 
 2.4. No harvest of trees on site unless in accordance with law and a sustainable 
management plan. 
 9.4. Burning is not allowed as a method of land preparation. 
 9.5. (critical criterion): The cutting of natural forest cover or burning to prepare new 
production areas is not permitted. 
There is, in addition, a voluntary climate module to which SAN-certified operations can certify. It 
reinforces and expands the climate-related commitments undertaken in the normal farm-level 
SAN certification. The standard was formally approved in 2010, with Ghanaian cocoa used as 
one of the testing grounds for consultation. It focuses on both mitigation and adaptation. This 
standard is not yet widely used, and is not covered in the present analysis, but could in the 
future become a significant tool for achieving climate objectives. 
Fairtrade 
The Fairtrade Labelling Organization has product-specific standards for small producer 
organisations (SPOs), including one specific to cocoa.11 The product-specific standards are 
complements to the more general SPO standard, and applicants must adhere to the 
requirements of both to gain certification.  
                                                          
11 The version used in this analysis is 01.05.2011_v1.2.  The next periodic review of this standard is 
expected some time in 2015, but was not ready at the time of writing. 
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The general standard outlines expected practices in four areas, including production and trade 
of the product. In each area there are a number of requirements that must be met, including 
various ‘core’ requirements. To be certified, SPOs must fulfil all the core requirements, and also 
gain a minimum score against the other requirements. That minimum is variable depending on 
the number of years in operation, with continuous improvement expected. The product-specific 
standard goes into more depth on such matters as pricing, contracts and credit, but not on any 
issues of particularly direct relevance to climate change. 
The areas of the standard that are most relevant to climate change are: 
 3.2.33  Your members must avoid negative impacts on protected areas and in areas with 
high conservation value within or outside the farm or production areas from the date of 
application for certification. The areas that are used or converted to production of the 
Fairtrade crop must comply with national legislation in relation to agricultural land use. 
 3.2.39  In central processing facilities where non-renewable energy is used you must 
keep records of energy consumption, take measures to use energy more efficiently and 
replace non-renewable sources by renewable ones as far as possible. 
 3.2.40  You must report on practices that you or the members of your organization carry 
out to reduce GHG emissions and increase carbon sequestration. 
Organic 
There is no single organic standard, but rather a multiplicity of standards. Many countries have 
national-level standards propounded by their standard-setting bodies and certified by various 
private sector certifying agencies. There is also an international effort that brings together the 
various sub-global initiatives: the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements 
(IFOAM). 
IFOAM itself produces three standards, or norms: one for objectives and requirements of any 
organic standard, one for accrediting certifiers of any organic standard, and one for organic 
production and processing (The IFOAM Standard for Organic Production and Processing, or 
hereinafter, the IFOAM Standard). IFOAM also accredits certifiers to its standards. Most 
national-level organic standards should comply with the IFOAM norms to have credibility, or to 
be good candidates for mutual recognition between different national standards.  Ghana does 
not have a national set of organic standards, and the organic certified cocoa coming from Ghana 
tends to be certified according to the IFOAM Standard for production and processing. 
The IFOAM Standard is structured as nine sections (crop production, processing and handling, 
etc.).  Each section is populated with a number of requirements. There is no scoring system as 
with the other standards described above; any operation to be certified must follow all of the 
specified requirements. 
There is only one requirement that is directly relevant to climate change in the IFOAM Standard, 
in the section: Organic Ecosystems: 
 2.1.2 Clearing or destruction of High Conservation Value Areas is prohibited. Farming 
areas installed on land that has been obtained by clearing of High Conservation Value 
Areas in the preceding 5 years shall not be considered compliant with this standard. 
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A high conservation value area is: “An area that has been identified as having outstanding and 
critical importance due to is environmental, socioeconomic, biodiversity of landscape values.” 
While there is not a perfect correspondence between such areas and those areas of importance 
from carbon stock perspective, there is also clearly some overlap. 
2.3.2. The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
Palm oil is the most widely used vegetable oil in the world, constituting about one third of all 
vegetable oils used. It is used both for cooking and as an ingredient in processed foods, as well 
as finding use as a feedstock for biodiesel. It is one of the few vegetable fats that is semi-solid at 
room temperature, making it an ideal base while also being preferable on health grounds to 
hydrogenated oils. 
Figure 7. Global Palm Oil Exports, 2013 
 
Source: UNCTAD COMTRADE Database (HS 151110 and 151190) 
It is highly traded commodity, with global exports of crude and processed oil in 2013 totalling 
over $9.3 trillion.12  Figure 7 shows the major exporters, of which Indonesia and Malaysia stand 
out as leaders with a combined global market share of over 86%.13 Major importers are shown 
in Figure 8. Just under 60% of global imports are in India, China, Pakistan and Bangladesh, whose 
final consumers value palm oil as an inexpensive and versatile cooking oil, or a food processing 
agent. The next most significant importer is the EU-28 at 24% of global imports,14 some 40% of 
which in 2012 was ultimately processed as biodiesel (Europe Economics, 2014). The remaining 
60% was mostly destined to be used in food processing, though a small percentage is also used 
for soaps and cosmetics.  Imports to the US (4% of global imports) are predominantly used as an 
input to food processing. Obidzinski (2013) reports that roughly half of production in Indonesia 
is exported as crude palm oil for further processing, while half is processed domestically and 
either exported as a processed good or consumed locally. 
 
  
                                                          
12 UNCTAD COMTRADE database (HS 151110). 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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Figure 8. Major Palm Oil Importers (2013-14) 
 
Source: Oil World (2015) 
Acreage devoted to palm oil in Southeast Asia tripled in the space of the last decade, reaching a 
footprint of 16.4 million hectares in 2012 (Potts et al. 2014:238).  Production is split between 
smallholder producers and large plantations, and involves an estimated 3 million smallholder 
producers (Ibid). In Indonesia in 2012 roughly 35% of production was from independent 
smallholders, and 50% is from large private multinationals on plantations (Indonesia 
Investments, n.d.). In Malaysia as of 2012 the large plantation model held 61% of production, 
with 14% independent smallholders and 25% smallholders organised by government agencies 
(Malaysian Palm Oil Board 2012 (cited in Mahat, 2012). 
The next chapter discusses in some depth the nature of the environmental concerns with palm 
oil production, but essentially they boil down to the fact that much of the acreage devoted to 
palm oil in Malaysia and Indonesia is converted from peat swamps which, as noted in the 
previous chapter, has major implications for climate change. There is also concern that 
deforestation and conversion on these lands significantly reduces the habitat for a number of 
native endangered species. 
As a result of those concerns, and facing potential consumer backlash against their products in 
the major OECD consuming countries, a small group of major producers and buyers of palm oil 
in 2004 spearheaded the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil. Its objectives were to establish a 
process standard and a certification regime that would give environmental credibility to labelled 
palm oil, protecting the major advances in market share made by the product over the last two 
decades. A minor portion of palm oil production is also certified organic, and certified by 
Rainforest Alliance, but RSPO completely dominates the market for standards-compliant 
production.  According to RSPO (2015), Certified Sustainable Palm Oil (CSPO) production 
increased roughly 25-fold from 619,000 tonnes in 2008 to 11.6 million tonnes in 2015. As of 
2015, RSPO certified production constituted 20% of the total global market for palm oil, up from 
2% in 2008 (Ibid, and Potts et al., 2014). 
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RSPO has grown from a relatively small group of major producers and buyers to a global multi-
stakeholder operation, claiming more than 2,300 members including producers, processors, 
buyers, retailers, financiers and NGOs. Much of the impetus for the organisation’s growth comes 
from the need to secure the EU markets for both food uses and biodiesel, as well as the smaller 
US markets, in both of which the industry hopes for continued growth. There is no significant 
demand for standard-compliant products in the major Asian consuming countries. 
RSPO publishes a set of Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Palm Oil Production, to which 
members can certify using accredited third party certifiers.  These consist of eight principles and 
numerous related criteria, all of which underwent a major revision in 2013.  That revision 
brought more climate-related tests into the final document – the result of recommendations 
from the RSPO GHG Working Group.  As discussed below, more work is ongoing to fully 
operationalise the revisions.  Those aspects of the principles and criteria most relevant to 
climate change are: 
 5.4 Efficiency of fossil fuel use and the use of renewable energy is optimised.  
o Indicator:  A plan for improving efficiency of the use of fossil fuels and to 
optimise renewable energy shall be in place and monitored.  
 
 5.5: Use of fire for preparing land or replanting is avoided, except in specific situations 
as identified in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) guidelines or other 
regional best practice.  
o Indicator:  There shall be no land preparation by burning, other than in specific 
situations as identified in the ‘Guidelines for the Implementation of the ASEAN 
Policy on Zero Burning’ 2003, or comparable guidelines in other regions.  
o Indicator:  Where fire has been used for preparing land for replanting, there 
shall be evidence of prior approval of the controlled burning as specified in 
‘Guidelines for the Implementation of the ASEAN Policy on Zero Burning’ 2003, 
or comparable guidelines in other regions.   
 
 5.6: Plans to reduce pollution and emissions, including greenhouse gases, are 
developed, implemented and monitored  
o Indicator:  An assessment of all polluting activities shall be conducted, including 
gaseous emissions, particulate/soot emissions and effluent (see Criterion 4.4).  
o Indicator:  Significant pollutants and GHG emissions shall be identified, and 
plans to reduce or minimise them implemented.  
o Indicator:  A monitoring system shall be in place, with regular reporting on 
progress for these significant pollutants and emissions from estate and mill 
operations, using appropriate tools.  
 
 7.8: New plantation developments are designed to minimise net greenhouse gas 
emissions.  
o Indicator:  The carbon stock of the proposed development area and major 
potential sources of emissions that may result directly from the development 
shall be identified and estimated.  
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o Indicator:  There shall be a plan to minimise net GHG emissions which takes into 
account avoidance of land areas with high carbon stocks and/or sequestration 
options.  
 
 8.1.1 The action plan for continual improvement shall be implemented, based on a 
consideration of the main social and environmental impacts and opportunities of the 
grower/mill, and shall include a range of Indicators covered by these Principles and 
Criteria. These include the following GHG-related indicators: 
o Environmental impacts (Criteria 4.3, 5.1 and 5.2);  
o Waste reduction (Criterion 5.3);  
o Pollution and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Criteria 5.6 and 7.8);  
2.3.3. EU Product Environmental Footprinting (PEF) 
In 2010 the European Council (European Commission, 2010) invited the Commission to “develop 
a common methodology on the quantitative assessment of environmental impacts of products, 
throughout their life-cycle, in order to support the assessment and labelling of products.” 
After further study of existing methodologies for environmental footprinting of products and 
organisations, the EC in 2013 launched the initiative Building the Single Market for Green 
Products, which aimed to, among other things: 
 Make it less confusing for consumers facing a barrage of differing ‘green’ claims; 
 Make it easier for producers wishing to conform to green criteria, but facing different 
schemes in each different jurisdiction, and a variety of sui generis private sector 
schemes. 
A central element of the initiative is a pilot phase of environmental footprinting of products and 
organisations, a pilot phase running from 2013 – 2016 in which a number of candidate products 
are assigned common methodologies for given product categories, common methods for 
verification, and common rules for communicating the results. During the pilot phase the 
methodologies for environmental footprinting are being road-tested by stakeholders in a 
voluntary process. The so-called first wave of pilots involved 14 product categories, mostly 
consumer goods and none of them food-related.  The second wave of pilots started in June 2014 
and involved the following 11 products, all food-related: 
 Beer 
 Coffee 
 Fish 
 Dairy products 
 Feed 
 Meat 
 Pet food 
 Olive oil  
 Pasta 
 Wine 
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 Bottled water 
The stakeholders for each of these product categories are the leading food and beverage 
manufacturers and processors in Europe (some foreign firms are also involved – 12% of total 
stakeholders). Some 73% of the pilots have a majority of the relevant EU industry involved in the 
process, with 777 individual stakeholders from the 27 food and non-food pilots (Galatola, 2014). 
At the end of the pilot in 2016 the EC will take stock.  Recommendations at that time might be 
for further development of methodologies, or for wider application on a voluntary basis.  They 
might also include a recommendation for the mandatory application of the environmental 
footprinting regime; this was one of the options explicitly evaluated in the Staff Working 
Document accompanying the Communication from the Commission on Building a Single Market 
for Green Products (EC 2013).  The evaluation found that a mandatory regime would have 
positive environmental impacts, but did not rate highly on social or economic impacts.  Further, 
it found that the mandatory option was strongly opposed by the stakeholders.  Given that 
assessment, as well as the significant administrative and legal difficulties involved in 
implementing a mandatory regime, the final recommendation in the Staff Working Document 
was to apply the product and organisation environmental footprints on a voluntary basis.  It 
therefore is unlikely – but of course still possible – that a mandatory regime would be the 
recommended option at the end of the pilot phase. It is hoped that the voluntary regime will 
offer national standard-setting bodies, producers and retailers a sort of ‘rallying point’ around 
which their individual efforts might coalesce. 
The methodologies used to assess environmental footprints contain elements, among others, 
that assess the carbon emissions associated with the respective products along their life cycle. 
They build on similar methodologies in use in other contexts, such as the GHG Protocol, ISO 
14064, PAS 2050.  
While the environmental footprinting initiative is not billed as a labelling regime, it functions in 
much the same way as any such regime, assessing the environmental impacts across the life 
cycle, verifying the adherence to the established standards, and communicating the results. 
The initiative builds on, and is complemented by, another similar initiative: the European Food 
Sustainable Consumption and Production Round Table’s ENVIFOOD Protocol (SCP Round Table, 
2013).  The Round Table is composed mostly of European industry associations associated with 
the food sector: producers, processors, retailers. It also counts as members the Sustainability 
Consortium, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, and the World Resources 
Institute. It is co-chaired by a Round Table member and the European Commission – an 
arrangement that should help ensure complementarity of efforts between their work and the EC 
Single Market for Green Products initiative. 
The Protocol seeks to answer many of the same methodological questions being explored by the 
PEF exercise: what are the appropriate product categories? What is a representative product in 
each of those categories? What are the product category rules? In that sense it serves as an 
important contribution to the EC effort. 
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 Impacts of food labelling 
This section will consider the impacts of the surveyed regimes. The aim is to assess the impacts 
that would occur under a labelling scenario against a baseline scenario where no labelling 
regime existed. The relevant impact categories are split into economic, environmental and 
social. The scope of the analysis covers the impacts of the policy both where it is implemented 
(i.e., label host country) and in other jurisdictions (e.g., producer countries).  Global impacts are 
also considered, as in the case of GHG emissions.  For the most part the analysis focuses on the 
current impacts, but where relevant the impacts of trends and potential future developments 
are also considered. 
The final result is a very broad set of possible impact categories, spread across many actors and 
jurisdictions. Ultimately the analysis is narrowed down to focus on those that are most 
significant given the objectives of the overall investigative effort: uncovering the wider 
(sustainable development) impacts of climate related policies, with a special focus on 
international impacts. 
 Cocoa labelling in Ghana 
Of the three sub-cases studied in this paper, Ghanaian cocoa is by far the most thoroughly 
researched in terms of potential impacts of labelling. This is probably due at least in part to 
timing; the cocoa sustainability initiatives have been ongoing for decades whereas RSPO only 
formed in 2008 and the EU’s PEF is still a work in progress. 
As noted above, there are four active sustainability labelling schemes in Ghana for cocoa: 
Rainforest International, UTZ, Fairtrade and Organic. What follows is a survey of the literature 
on the types of impacts that have been found and attributed to the various schemes. 
3.1.1. Economic impacts 
In terms of trade impacts, the trend in shift from conventional to sustainably labelled cocoa is 
remarkable. As noted above, standard-compliant cocoa grew as a percentage of the global 
market from 3% in 2008 to 22% in 2012 – a 633% increase and an average compound annual 
growth of 65%.15 The declaration by several of the major confectioners (comprising over 50% of 
the global buying market) that they will move to 100% sustainably sourced cocoa by 2020, as 
well as a similar declaration of intent by the Netherlands (Vernooij, 2010) (which processes a 
quarter of all cocoa globally) is driving rapid and fundamental change in this market.  
The private standards surveyed here are technically voluntary (and the Dutch commitment is 
not a standard or regulation, but rather a declaration of intent to help stakeholders move 
toward the agreed objective). But, as was noted above, when a voluntary standard becomes 
mainstream, it begins to resemble a mandatory standard more closely – a condition of market 
access. Wouters and Garaets (2012) note that while private sector standards are by definition 
not mandatory, “the fact that a particular set of standards is used across the board in a certain 
                                                          
15 The 22% figure (from Potts et al., 2014) accounts for a large amount of so-called double certification – 
certification to more than one standard. 
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sector may render the choice of individual producers or suppliers rather limited.” Certainly by 
2020 it will be difficult to find markets for non-labelled cocoa.  At that point it may simply make 
sense for practically all production to be standard-compliant, whether eventually sold as such or 
not. 
At that point, and to a lesser extent currently, the standards will act as significant trade 
restrictions. But this probably will not entail any major reshaping of global markets in terms of 
country market share. The major producing countries – Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire – are already 
well on their way to more widespread use of the various sustainability standards, and the final 
transition is far enough off that it will likely be implemented without major disruption. The 
buyers will probably help ensure a smooth transition to compliance through capacity building 
where necessary; several have already been involved in such efforts. As such the current 
producing countries will probably not lose market share. 
That is not to say, however, that labelling does not have impacts at the producer level that will 
create new winners and losers; it does. The characteristics of the producers may change 
significantly (see discussion below). ITC (2013) and KPMG (2012) note that sustainability 
standards will tend to work against smaller producers, for at least two reasons.  First, the fixed 
costs of certification and the inevitable restructuring of management systems are more easily 
borne by those producers with larger revenues over which to spread those costs. Second, 
buyers tend to prefer larger producers, and will buy from them in preference to smaller 
producers. This is because when the buyer is tasked with ensuring the sustainability of the 
supply chain, it is much simpler to do so with a smaller number of large producers. This is both a 
straightforward game of numbers – less is better – and also a matter of the tendency for smaller 
producers to be less educated and therefore harder to train in new practices.16 This finding is 
consistent with findings in the broader literature on quality and safety standards.17 
The final impact in a sector like cocoa in Ghana, which is heavily dominated by smallholder 
producers, may be profound. In some sectors these pressures have resulted in a change in the 
structure of the market, with a move to vertical integration under the control of the traders and 
processors (ITC 2013), but this has not yet happened in Ghana.  Rather, virtually all efforts to 
date to certify producers have involved smallholders banding together in producers’ 
cooperatives of some sort. These provide the institutional framework under which training and 
quality assurance is affordable for smallholders. The various producer groups of Ghana, 
established in the first instance in response to the demands of certification, have also innovated 
to be helpful to producers in a number of other ways, depending on their mandates: 
Some provide credit to producers, who as noted above face extraordinarily high commercial 
rates where credit is even available. This often comes in the form of provided inputs such as 
fertilisers, pesticides, fungicides and seedlings – inputs whose costs can be repaid at the time of 
harvest. 
                                                          
16 Deppeler, Fromm and Aidoo (2014) note that illiterate producers have a higher tendency to drop out of 
certification programs under both UTZ and Rainforest Alliance regimes, and speculates that it is because 
the training is too difficult for them, relative to literate producers. 
17 In the context of agricultural product standards, for example, see Ferro, Wilson and Otsuki (2013). 
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All provide in-depth training on good agricultural practices, usually focused on the requirements 
of the standard to which they are aiming. 
Most administer the premiums paid by buyers, with some dedicating a portion to community 
projects such as corn mills, clinics, schools, etc. The remainder is typically split between direct 
payment to farmers and the costs of certification. 
Ultimately, many of the effects of smallholders coming together in cooperatives can be regarded 
as positive economic effects of the standards examined here. Better access to credit and inputs 
was highlighted by KPMG (2012) in its assessment of Ghanaian cocoa standards. Bethge (2014) 
cites better access to inputs as one of the main reasons producers join Rainforest Alliance-
focused cooperatives (although CEval [2012] found no difference in access to credit between the 
target and control groups in his study of the Fairtrade standard). Deppeler, Fromm and Aidoo 
(2014) found that training was the most valued aspect of the certification regimes for his 
respondents. 
Most studies found an increase in yields as a result of certification – a finding they attribute to 
the training in good agricultural practices such as proper use of chemical inputs, proper 
composting and fermentation techniques, etc. (See COSA/ISSER (2013); KPMG (2012); Depeller, 
Fromm and Aidoo (2014), Bethge (2014); Waarts et al (2013)). Bethge (op. cit.) found average 
productivity in Rainforest Alliance certified operations at 3.67 bags per hectare vs. 1.53 bags per 
hectare at the uncertified control groups. Those surveyed by Bethge (op. cit.) cite this improved 
farm management as the main benefit of certification, and for most the increased income 
available from increased yields is more significant than the income from premiums (Osei, 2015; 
also see Figure 9). 
The increase in income is a consistent finding across all studies, though the incidence varies (See 
CEval (2012); COSA/ISSER (2013)). It is in part a function of increased productivity, and in part a 
function of the premiums from certification. It has also been suggested that certification 
increases incomes by strengthening the producers’ negotiating positions.18  The costs of 
certification vary from scheme to scheme, but overall costs of certification tend to be less than 
the gains from certification. KPMG (2012) performed a cost-benefit analysis of Rainforest 
Alliance, Fairtrade and UTZ certification in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire and found that while costs of 
certification (including increased inputs, audit costs, labour costs) averaged $400/ton of cocoa, 
benefits averaged $625/ton, for a net return of $225/ton (see Figure 9). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 Argument ascribed to Fairtrade officials in KPMG (2012:fn 53). See also Ryan (2011). 
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Figure 9. Costs and Benefits of Certification (USD/ton of cocoa) 
 
Source: KPMG (2012). Based on averages for Rainforest Alliance, Fairtrade, UTZ, in Côte d'Ivoire and 
Ghana, 6-year period 
A number of surveys of Ghanaian producers also point to a less obvious potential economic 
benefit of certification: the producers have greater certainty that they are not being cheated 
when they sell through their cooperatives and associations (See Schweisguth (2015); Nelson et 
al (2013)). Apparently they do not feel as confident about their dealings one-on-one with the 
LBCs. 
Deppeler, Fromm and Aidoo (2014) note that the premiums and training, which constitute the 
bulk of the benefits of certification, do not necessarily accrue to hired labourers. In their 
surveys, 82% of respondents used hired labour at some point on the farms, though many of 
these would be just pulling in occasional labour for jobs such as spraying. Others, though, own 
land but do not work it – the shareholder model. Where this is the case, the benefits discussed 
above seldom actually reach the labourers. 
3.1.2. Social impacts 
There are a number of different types of social impacts associated with the labels surveyed, 
most of which are associated with the coming together of smallholders in cooperatives and 
associations to manage the requirements of certification.  
The extensive training referenced above, all surveys found, makes Ghanaian farmers more 
productive, improving their capacity to provide for themselves and their families. This is a 
lifelong improvement that is not tied to the label after it has been effected. 
Training is also important from a human health perspective. COSA/ISSER (2103), CEval (2012), 
and Bethge (2014) all found that trained producers were more likely to wear proper protective 
gear when applying toxic chemicals such as pesticides and fungicides, and more likely to use 
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appropriate doses when applying. The result is less exposure to potentially harmful compounds.  
COSA/ISSER (2013) also found significantly fewer farm injuries in the studied groups than in the 
control groups. 
There may also be positive gender impacts. CEval (2012) found that the Ghanaian Fairtrade 
groups he studied provided useful training for women not only in farming techniques but also in 
basic finances and alternative livelihoods. Bethge (2014) and ITC (2013) also found positive 
effects for women – Bethge in Ghanaian Rainforest Alliance schemes and ITC as a more general 
proposition. 
Bethge (2014) and CEval (2012) observe that the producers’ organisations (particularly those 
striving for a Fairtrade label) may devote a percentage of the label premium toward community 
projects. Several studies found that corn mills had been purchased for public use, for example. 
In one case a mobile clinic was created (CEval 2012). Such spending should provide social 
benefits. CEval (2012), however, found that in some cases the mechanism for deciding which 
projects to undertake was not transparent, and many producers did not even know that their 
premiums were being directed to such spending. He notes that, as a result, some such projects 
had little local buy-in and had fallen into disrepair. 
One of the initial drivers for labelling in the cocoa sector was the use of child labour in West 
African plantations (Oxfam, 2002). Child labour is a broad term that can describe anything from 
participation in family farm activities to abusive quasi-slavery arrangements, from labour under 
safe conditions to perilous activities with lack of safety equipment and training. It is difficult to 
distinguish the various types of child labour in the impact literature, but overall child labour 
seems to have declined in labelled operations.  COSA/ISSER (2013), for example, finds that while 
child labour declined in the studied operations from 2010 to 2012, it declined by significantly 
more in the target (UTZ labelled) groups than in the control groups. 
3.1.3. Environmental impacts 
From a climate change perspective, the key indicator for environmental impacts is the amount 
of forested land cleared for production. As noted above, until recently Ghana had been steadily 
losing virgin forest to cocoa in the West for some years – a trend that has now slowed. 
There are very few assessments of these sorts of impacts from labelling schemes in Ghana’s 
cocoa sector.  COSA/ISSER (2013) found that between 2010 and 2012 there had been a drop in 
the percentage of all farmers clearing natural areas for cocoa cultivation, but that the drop 
among UTZ-certified farmers (of more than 50%) was significantly greater than the drop among 
the non-certified control group. In neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire, COSA (n.d.) found that 43% of 
Rainforest Alliance certified producers had adopted at least one soil conservation measure (such 
as protecting shade trees), whereas only 5% of non-certified producers had done so. Given the 
criteria inherent in both standards, we would expect that certification would have impacts on 
the amount of new land cleared, and therefore the amount of GHGs emitted, but the hard 
evidence of such impacts is scarce. 
The biodiversity impacts of sustainability standards for cocoa in Ghana is closely aligned with the 
GHG impacts, dependent at least in part on farming practices that avoid clearing of new land for 
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cultivation. There are other aspects of the standards that also impact biodiversity, such as the 
requirement under Rainforest Alliance for the use of shade tree cultivation (as opposed to full 
sun cultivation), and the use of indigenous species of trees. Tondoh et al. (2015) assess full sun 
cultivation and describe in detail the significant negative consequences for biodiversity in Côte 
d'Ivoire, as well as the negative impacts on soil quality – findings that are applicable to Ghana.  
Gockowski and Sonwa (2010) survey the extensive increase in acreage of cocoa cultivation in the 
Guinea Rainforest (covering Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Cameroon) between 1988 and 
2007 when production doubled, primarily via conversion of forests. They calculate that the same 
increase in production could have taken place with “little or no increase in the area harvested 
through increased applications of fertilizers and agrochemicals. (Ibid:317)” Such a productivity-
led increase in production, they estimate, would have reduced the attendant CO2 emissions over 
that period by 1.37 billion tons. There is some disagreement in the literature over whether this 
intensive “land-sparing” model is preferable to an extensive model that incorporates shade 
cover and improved techniques (Wade et al., 2010) –also known as “wildlife-friendly farming”—
but there is no dispute as to the central proposition: that improved techniques are the key to 
reducing carbon emissions and preserving biodiversity, and that the potential savings are 
globally significant. To the extent that certification in Ghana leads to the sort of improvements 
described above, then it will contribute to preserving biodiversity and reducing GHG emissions 
(though nobody yet has tried to quantify that contribution). 
The Government of Ghana (2014), in an Emission Reduction Program Idea Note (ER-PIN) 
submitted to the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, has proposed an emission 
reduction program for the cocoa forest mosaic landscape (Cocoa Forest REDD+ Program) that 
recognizes clearly the climate-related contributions being made by certification schemes in 
country. It specifically identifies the efforts of Solidaridad (implementing the UTZ standard) and 
the Rainforest Alliance as partners in the program, and describes those efforts as ongoing 
implementation of some of the program’s cocoa oriented activities. As such it sees both regimes 
as an important part of its strategy to reduce emissions and deforestation. The ER-PIN notes, 
however, that the schemes in and of themselves are not sufficient – that an integrated 
landscape approach is needed to effect change at any significant scale. 
It was noted above that the training provided by cooperatives or buyers’ organisations was 
helpful in prescribing the proper use of pesticides and fungicides.  As well as the health benefits 
described above, the proper usage can have environmental benefits, if it prevents farmers from 
over-using these chemical inputs, or instructs them on alternatives such as composting as a way 
to boost soil nutrients. Both Bethge (2014) and CEval (2012) found this to be the case in the 
farms they surveyed, which were focused on certification by Rainforest Alliance and Fairtrade, 
respectively. 
As a general proposition, UTZ-certified farmers surveyed by  COSA/ISSER (2013) self-declared as 
taking “good” care of the environment significantly more than did the control group (72% vs. 
56%).  And far fewer of them characterised their current practice as “bad” for the environment 
(4% vs. 10%). 
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  RSPO (Palm Oil) 
The impacts of certification under the RSPO standard are not as extensively researched as is the 
case for certified cocoa. In part this is because the standard is relatively recent, and only in the 
last few years has begun to attain anything like critical mass in the global markets. Cocoa (along 
with coffee) was one of the original commodities to be the focus of sustainability certification 
efforts. 
3.2.1. Economic impacts 
Arguably the most important economic impact of the RSPO – and in fact its key objective from 
its inception – has been the preservation of market share for palm oil in the face of negative 
public views of the supply chain. Mahat (2012) shows that palm oil has experienced a 
spectacular rise in global market share, stealing existing markets from soybean oil and rapeseed 
oil – its most important competitors – to become the most widely traded vegetable oil in 
relatively few years. As noted above, acreage devoted to palm oil cultivation has tripled in the 
last decade.  
But palm oil’s future prospects for continued growth were and are threatened by consumer 
concerns about its impacts on climate change and biodiversity. These were fuelled in part by the 
non-food imports in the EU, which were benefiting from the EU’s Renewable Energy Directive 
(2009/28/EC) and Fuel Quality Directive (2009/30/EC).  The former mandates that 10% of all 
transport fuels in EU member states should come from renewable sources by 2020, and the 
latter mandates that the carbon-intensity of EU transport fuel should be reduced by 6% by 2020. 
On the face of it this would seem to heavily drive demand for biofuels, but there was strong 
concern that these regulations, propelled by concern for climate change, might end up 
supporting modes of biofuel production that were highly GHG-intensive (such as peat forest 
clearing for plantations), and damaging of biodiversity as well.  In response, the EU laid down 
sustainability criteria that any fuel would have to meet in order to count toward a member 
state’s renewable energy mandate. These criteria rule out production of biofuels on land 
converted from high carbon stocks (such as primary forests, peat swamps), or from land with 
high biodiversity value. These regulations do not directly affect palm oil food imports, but the 
campaigns that preceded them managed to bring some serious concerns to public attention. 
There have also been concerns raised about the treatment of workers on major plantations. 
A number of influential North American and European NGOs waged campaigns to raise 
consumer awareness about these issues, and targeted individual buyers and traders in strategic 
interventions designed to bring maximum pressure to bear.  The results have been impressive.  
Table 2 lists some of the large global buyers and processors that have pledged to source 
certified sustainable palm oil (CSPO) to varying degrees of stringency – all within the last five 
years.  As GIZ (2011:4) puts it: “Sustainability certification paves the way for access to 
international markets.”  The World Bank (2011:23) concurs: “As the palm oil industry moves 
toward certified sustainable palm oil production according to the standards set by the RSPO and 
other organizations, smallholders risk losing market share if they do not improve production 
practices to meet the stringent certification requirements.” 
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Table 2.  Commitments to CSPO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: Author’s compilation from company statements  
At the same time, this effect should not be overstated. The only buyers of note that are 
presently concerned about sustainability are North American and European, and those markets 
have a combined share of global imports of only 28% (Oil World 2015). These may be potential 
growth markets, and in the near term they will be practically inaccessible for non-certified palm 
oil, but there still remains the other 72% of the global market, which is much less concerned 
with how the commodity was produced.  
However, even the Asian markets may ultimately be demandeurs for CSPO, whether because 
their fledgling environmental NGOs manage to sway public opinion, or because the standard 
comes to signify quality production as much as it does environmental and social responsibility. 
Certainly the RSPO’s more than 2,300 members are not just thinking of the current 28%. WWF 
(2012) quoted several respondents that believed their markets in Asia would eventually demand 
Company Date Commitment level 
Nestlé current strong 
Unilever current medium/strong 
Danone current strong 
Ferrero current strong 
Mars Inc. current strong 
Hershey’s current medium/strong 
Sainsbury’s 2015 medium/strong 
Starbucks 2015 medium/strong 
MacDonald’s 2015 medium/strong 
Mondeléz 2015 medium/strong 
Kellogg’s 2015 strong 
General Mills 2015 medium 
ConAgra Foods 2015 strong 
Kao Corp (Japan) ongoing medium/strong 
Safeway-Albertson’s 2016 medium/strong 
Yum! Brands 2017 medium 
Heinz 2023 medium/weak 
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CSPO. It is worth noting that in just six years, between 2008 and 2014, global market share for 
CSPO grew from 2% to 20%.19 Those rates of growth testify to the strength of both consumer 
demand and supplier concern for market share. 
They may also point to demand from financiers. The World Bank, for example, suspended loans 
to the palm oil sector in 2009 pending a review that led to a new framework and International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) strategy for supporting the sector. Among other things under the new 
strategy, adopted in 2011, the IFC does not lend to operations that convert peat swamp, and it 
required all producers to become certified sustainable within three years in order to qualify for 
support (World Bank, 2011). A number of commercial financiers are also demanding the security 
of RSPO certification as a lending condition, even if the product is not destined for the US or EU 
markets.  In some cases this is a means to insulate unrelated branches of the borrower’s 
operations from consumer backlash in those markets, and in some cases certification is seen as 
signalling an important ‘license to operate’ in geopolitically unstable locations. 
An obvious benefit to certification is the premium received for CSPO. WWF (2012) found 
premiums ranging from zero to $30 per tonne of RSPO certified palm oil. RSPO’s Green Palm 
system allows producers to receive a credit for their certified production, which can then be sold 
to any participant in the value chain – not just the immediate buyer.  This is the least stringent 
form of labelling. Premiums tend to be higher (up to $50/tonne) for sustainable oil that has 
been physically separated the unsustainable product, or which allows any given shipment to be 
traced back to its origin. 
As in the cocoa sector, a critically important long-term impact of certification is quality 
improvement, as producers are forced to implement good practices of production, harvest, 
handling and management. WWF (2012), in an analysis that attempts to quantify the costs and 
benefits of certification to the producers, finds this benefit to clearly outweigh the benefits 
inherent in the premium for certification. Rather than give average figures for productivity gains, 
the study offers ranges, based on the very different experience of the different producers 
surveyed.  The study found that smallholders had the most to gain, some of them never even 
having recorded their yields before they were required to by RSPO, and several finding and 
resolving costly corruption issues once they implemented more rigorous management. One 
smallholder firm reported an increase of 186% in production per hectare after certifying. 
WWF (2012) also found efficiency improvements at large plantations and within the mills. 
Another significant benefit to the larger operators was a formalised protocol for community 
engagement (as well as the ability to reference company good practice under RSPO). They 
calculate that a single four-day shut-down of operations due to social disruptions at any point 
during the life of a typical plant’s operations exceeds $1 million in costs. Even without 
considering the other potential benefits of certification this far exceeds the cost of RSPO. One 
operation invested $30,000 in the early stages of land acquisition, and suggests that it might 
have averted costs associated with community disputes that, during its previous acquisition, 
totalled $15 million. 
                                                          
19 2008 figure: Potts et al. (2014).  2014 figure: RSPO (2015). 
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As in the case of cocoa, smallholders need training and capacity building to understand and 
comply with the new standards, and such assistance almost always goes through producer 
cooperatives. Training is needed both as an initial proposition and as an ongoing effort. Most 
often the funds for this come from some combination of the estate/buyer and the smallholders 
themselves, with foreign donors sometimes also contributing.  
A potential negative economic impact of RSPO is increased food insecurity for consumers of 
palm oil, particularly those in South- and South-East Asia. World Growth (2010) argues that any 
requirements that limit the land on which palm oil production can expand will necessarily limit 
supply. This, they contend, would increase prices by the simple laws of supply and demand, and 
would increase costs for those that rely on palm oil as a cooking oil or food additive.  
It is certainly true that Asian consumers of palm oil are benefiting from its low price relative to 
its competitors.  In the five-year period between 2010 and 2015 palm oil prices have averaged 
18.6% lower than the average of rapeseed oil and soybean oil prices, ranging from 7.1% to a gap 
of 37.4%.20 It is also true that the main importers of palm oil also have significant numbers of 
the world’s hungry, for whom any price increases would be significant (see Figure 10). 
Figure 10: Palm oil imports and hunger 
Source: Oil World, 2015, FAO, 2015 
USDA (2011) makes the same point, noting the lack of room to expand in Malaysia and the 
potential environmental obstacles to expansion in Indonesia: 
“With intense pressure being brought to bear on the Indonesian government to 
halt or slow its own oil palm plantation expansion owing to international 
environmental and greenhouse gas concerns, the prospect of stagnating Malaysian 
production substantially increases the likelihood of sustained high prices in the 
edible oil market. Since palm oil is the world’s cheapest edible oil, it has become 
the primary cooking oil for the majority of people in the developing world of Asia, 
Africa, and the Middle East. The consumer base in these regions is large, growing, 
poor, and highly price-sensitive. Given there are currently no viable and affordable 
alternatives to palm oil for most of these consumers, any significant reduction in 
                                                          
20 Figures derived from data found at IndexMundi for commodity prices: palm oil, rapeseed oil and 
soybean oil (July 2010 – July 2015). 
 Palm oil imports 
(1000 T) 
Share of Global 
Imports 
Malnourished 
(million) 
Share of Global 
Hungry 
India 7,839 26% 194.6 24% 
China 5,888 20% 133.8 17% 
Pakistan 2,361 8% 41.4 5% 
Bangladesh 1,284 4% 26.3 3% 
Totals  82%  50 
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the growth rate of Malaysian production will make it difficult for them to increase 
the use of edible oils in their diets.” 
Of course, this impact may well be offset by productivity increases as a result of certification. 
And it is not clear what the actual price impacts might be. Brahmbhatt and Christiaensen (2008) 
note that cooking oil constitutes just over 5% of daily calorific intake for the average East Asian 
household, giving us a very rough indication that it may not be a particularly significant portion 
of household expenditures. While any increase is significant for the poor of Asia, this particular 
increase might not be out of line with normal fluctuations in prices of foodstuffs. 
Another potential negative impact of certification is the classic standards effect: it is 
disproportionately difficult for small and medium-sized enterprises to meet the RSPO 
requirements (WWF 2012). As noted above, the palm oil sector is divided between plantation-
style operators and smallholders, with the latter being either organised in contracted 
cooperatives, or independent. GIZ (2011) estimates the percentage of smallholder acreage in 
Indonesia to be 44%, with the corresponding figures in Malaysia and Thailand at 30% and 80%. 
The costs of certification, if not supported, can be expected to hasten a model where the 
smallholder producers are replaced by vertically integrated operations. Those smallholder 
operations, however, were a deliberate result of extensive efforts by both the Malaysian and 
Indonesian governments’ intent on rural development and poverty alleviation (Mahat 2012). 
3.2.2. Social impacts 
The key social impacts of RSPO certification are fundamentally linked to the economic impacts 
discussed above. For example, the maintenance of market access for palm oil is a major benefit 
to the many rural poor employed and self-employed in the sector.  Palm oil is a particularly 
labour-intensive crop, and creates many more jobs than its closest substitutes; WWF (2012) 
notes that while palm oil requires an average of 5 workers per hectare, soybean oil and 
rapeseed oil – both predominantly produced under capital-intensive systems – often require as 
little as one worker per 100 hectares. As such, maintenance of market share for palm oil has 
important livelihood and poverty alleviation impacts, to the extent that it can be linked to RSPO 
certification. 
The disproportionate costs for smallholders are also of interest. If indeed they represent a 
disincentive for the smallholder model and an advantage for the vertically integrated model, 
then as the standard becomes more mainstream many self-employed producers will become 
sharecroppers or wage labourers. Final impacts on wellbeing would be complex to predict in 
such a scenario, but it is fair to assume that most existing smallholders prefer their current 
arrangements (if not, they would change them autonomously).  
Food security is also a pressing social impact. If widespread adoption of the RSPO standard 
causes price increases for palm oil then the impacts on poor Asian consumers will be negative. It 
was noted above that this effect is difficult to quantify, and may be less significant than argued 
by, for example, World Growth (2010). But it is nonetheless an important and undesirable side 
effect of certification. 
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3.2.3. Environmental impacts 
The environmental impacts of RSPO revolve primarily around the strictures that the standard 
places on the clearing of new land for cultivation, and in particular the clearing of peat swamp 
land. There are other environmental impacts as well, as discussed below but, to be clear, they 
are of a different order of magnitude. 
The environmental elements in RSPO’s 2013 revised principles and criteria as described in 
Section 2.3.2 above. The 2013 revision, after much discussion, saw a number of new GHG-
related elements added in response to recommendations from the RSPO’s GHG Working Group. 
The principle most relevant to peat swamp clearing is the new principle 7.8: “New plantation 
developments are designed to minimise net greenhouse gas emissions.” In practice this means 
identifying and reporting all significant GHG emissions from new planting, and having a plan to 
avoid or mitigate major emissions. The guidance for the plan includes the following: “Growers 
are strongly encouraged to establish new plantings on mineral soils, in low carbon stock areas, 
and cultivated areas, which the current users are willing to develop into oil palm.” This is not as 
strong as an outright prohibition, but it squarely addresses the most controversial and 
significant environmental impact of palm oil cultivation. 
The principle is, however, subject to the caveat that the methodologies for projecting the 
relevant emissions are not yet adequate. There will be an implementation period in which 
growers and millers will promote best practice reporting, using the RSPO’s PalmGHG tool among 
others, and as of 2017 they commit to public reporting and planning. 
Given that the principle is not yet fully in force, it is difficult to estimate what sort of 
environmental impacts it might have had. It is possible, however, to roughly estimate what this 
principle would mean if it were in force and faithfully implemented. For the sake of this 
calculation we use Indonesia only, since it is there that the bulk of any major expansion of peat 
swamp clearing would have to take place. Margono et al., (2014) identified a loss of primary 
forest in Indonesia at a rate of 820,000 ha/year in 2011 and 2012.21  They calculate that 43% of 
that (or 353,000 ha) was peat swamp, and the rest was mineral soil forests. Koh et al (2011) 
estimated the volume of GHG emissions from peat swamp clearance as follows:  
 Above-ground emissions = 155.5 ± 39.2 mg/ha 
 Below-ground emissions = 5.2 ± 1.1 mg/ha 
 Emissions from lost carbon sequestration (annually) = 0.75 ± 0.25 mg/ha 
If we disregard the margins of error, and ignore the compounding inherent in annual 
contributions from lost sequestration services, we arrive at a figure of 160.95 mg/ha.  Applying 
this to the 2012 figure for peat swamp clearance cited by Margono et al (2014) gives us an 
annual figure of 56.8 million tonnes of CO2e. To put this into perspective, if Principle 7.8 of the 
                                                          
21 These figures are, it is worth noting, for a time period most of which is after the 2011 Indonesian 
moratorium on new clearing for palm oil. For details on the moratorium see Austin, Sheppard and Stolle 
(2012). 
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RSPO principles and criteria had been followed strictly in Indonesia in 2012, it would have saved 
the equivalent of 7.5% of Indonesia’s GHG emissions in that year.22 
This figure represents the estimated amount of emissions that would be reduced if the RSPO 
guidance were followed strictly and universally. It is based on Indonesian figures only (though 
for good reason) and it excludes the emissions from clearing of mineral soil forests (which 
constituted 57% of primary forest clearance) and degraded forest areas. As such it is useful as a 
notional figure – one that demonstrates the potential order of magnitude of impact – rather 
than as a precise estimate. 
The tendency of drained peat swamps to burn is also a climate change concern. Large-scale 
burning events have periodically engulfed the South-East Asian region after planters lost control 
of fires used to clear new land or prepare land for planting. The resulting fires release large 
amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. A major Indonesian fire event in 1997 is estimated to 
have released 190 – 230 MtCO2e (Page et al., 2002). To the extent that RSPO principles and 
criteria are obeyed, the risk of such fires is minimised. Principle 5.5 states: “Use of fire for 
preparing land or replanting is avoided, except in specific situations as identified in the ASEAN 
guidelines or other regional best practice.” 
Closely linked with the impacts on climate change are impacts on biodiversity. As with cocoa, 
the main driver of biodiversity loss is clearing of primary forests for cultivation. To the extent 
that respect for RSPO principles and criteria can limit clearing of primary forests, it can also limit 
biodiversity loss. Fitzhebert et al. (2008) found in a literature review that palm oil groves 
contained fewer than half as many vertebrates as primary forests. Across all taxa, they found 
that palm oil plantations contained a mean of 15% as many species as did primary forest. Koh et 
al (2011) mapped cleared lands in Sumatra, Borneo and Peninsular Malaysia, and found that the 
conversion of tropical peatlands had accounted for losses of biodiversity of 3.4%, 1% and 12.1% 
respectively.  
RSPO certification addresses these sorts of losses in two ways: first, it prohibits clearing of “high 
conservation value” (HCV) land for the purpose of cultivation.  Second, to the extent that it 
increases productivity through good agricultural practice, it translates into a need for less land 
per unit of output.  
There are also some negative potential impacts of RSPO. For one thing, analysts such as 
Greenpeace (2013) and Laurance et al., 2010 allege that some RSPO members regularly cheat on 
their commitments, and that RSPO is not aggressive enough about policing and disciplining 
them. This means that not all palm oil certified as sustainable by RSPO may actually be so – 
arguably a worse outcome than what would prevail in the absence of RSPO, since at least in that 
scenario there would be more openness about the nature of the transgressions. 
In addition, a 2013 assessment of members’ compliance with the RSPO principles and criteria 
showed among other things that just over 50% had time-bound plans to certify their estates, 
and 68% had no time-bound plans to certify their contracted smallholders (WWF 2013). This is a 
                                                          
22 Indonesia’s 2012 emission figures are sourced from WRI’s CAIT database: 761 MtCO2e (excluding land 
use change and forestry). 
35 
separate issue from the one raised above: members of RSPO can benefit from their green 
credentials without actually earning them.23 In either case the result is environmentally 
damaging because the damage is being hidden from the public eye by the cover of RSPO 
credentials. 
Another potential negative impact from RSPO labelling stems from the possibility that 
sustainability certification will increase the costs of palm oil or limit quantities available. Any 
such limitation would result in increased production of substitutes for palm oil – primarily 
soybean oil or rapeseed oil. But these two oils are more land-intensive than palm oil, rapeseed 
demands five times as many acres to produce an equivalent weight of oil, and soy demands nine 
times (see Figure 11). In terms of land conversion and habitat destruction, then, palm oil is 
orders of magnitude environmentally superior to the substitutes.  But the ratios implied in 
Figure 11 only hold if we regard an acre of land suited to oil palm and an acre of land suited to 
soy or rapeseed as equally environmentally valuable. In fact those ratios, while they are 
significant, may need to be somewhat discounted. 
Figure 11. Yield of major oilseeds (tonnes/acre/yr) 
 
Source: Lam et al. (2009) 
 EU’s Product Environmental Footprinting 
Of the three sub-case studies, the EU’s effort on PEF has the lightest body of assessment. This is 
in part because the regime is at this point still in pilot phase. Accordingly, much of what follows 
is taken from international literature focusing on labels and standards similar to those that the 
EU is propounding. 
3.3.1. Economic and social impacts 
The impacts discussed here all focus on the ways in which standards can affect market access. 
The economic impacts of restricted market access are clearly also drivers of social impacts in the 
area of employment, income generation and poverty alleviation. The impacts of facilitating 
market access through harmonisation of standards offers the flip side of the same dynamic. As 
                                                          
23 RSPO members are supposed to abide by the Principles and Criteria even if they are not certifying their 
product. 
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such, this section will discuss economic and social impacts as a single theme rather than as 
separate topics. 
The impact of primary interest, and one of the explicit objectives of the effort, is to reduce costs 
and increase market access for those producers who might qualify, or want to qualify, for special 
treatment on environmental grounds, but who are faced with a plethora of different standards 
in each different market, and in some case in each retailer within a given market. Producers of 
input goods may also be mandated by several different buyers to follow different standards for 
each, as each pursues its own system of managing the supply chain.  
This is the classic economic case for harmonisation of standards. In the EU market there are a 
number of national initiatives that cause this sort of barrier to exporters. EC (2013:12) bemoans 
the rapidly increasing number of available methodologies for communicating the environmental 
attributes of products, leading to “a proliferation of national and private sector initiatives” 
(emphasis in the original).  It cites the example of carbon footprint labelling, where there is a 
plethora of existing methodologies from which to choose:  PAS 2050, BP-X30-323, the ISO 
14,000 family of standards, the GHG Protocol and others. Marx and Wouters (2014) agree that 
proliferation is a problem, citing more than 400 voluntary sustainability standards in operation 
globally, and pointing to problems such as a credibility gap, high costs of certifying to multiple 
standards. 
A potential negative impact of the PEF effort is another classic impact of standards: they are 
inherently more difficult for smaller firms to meet, and particularly difficult for small foreign 
firms for whom access to information may be a problem (ITC 2013). The tendency in the face of 
standards that reach back up the supply chain is toward vertical integration, which is a more 
cost effective way of ensuring that the demands of environmental quality are in fact observed at 
the various links in the chain. There is also a tendency for such standards to favour domestic and 
developed country producers (Shi 2013). 
Clearly these tendencies will play out differently depending on the goods in question. Goods 
that rely on many small producers at the base of the value chain (like cocoa, palm oil, shrimp, 
rice and other major developing country agri-food exports) will tend to suffer 
disproportionately. 
These effects are all more acute in the case of a label as a condition of sale (particularly when 
demanded by government) than in the case of a purely voluntary standard. In the latter case, if 
compliance with a standard is too costly the producer simply remains a supplier to the 
conventional market, leaving the standard-compliant market to other producers. As discussed 
above, of course, the ability to do this is lessened the more widely accepted the standard 
becomes. At the level of widespread uptake, even voluntary standards take on the effects of 
mandatory standards from the perspective of producers. 
It is also worth noting that there are ways to address these challenges, primary among which is 
transparency of the standard and its requirements, with such facilities as a national point of 
contact for any questions foreign producers may have, and straightforward mechanisms for 
receiving comments on standards while they are still in draft form. This theme will be addressed 
in greater depth in Section 4. 
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Similarly, capacity building for producers has repeatedly shown itself to be effective in 
alleviating some of the challenges faced by producers in this situation. ITC (2012) catalogues a 
number of areas of research and development that might help developing country exporters 
better comply with carbon-related standards in their target markets. The beneficial impact of 
training and capacity building is well illustrated in the cases of cocoa and palm oil surveyed 
above. This theme will also be addressed in greater depth below. 
3.3.2. Environmental impact 
EC (2013) argues strongly for the environmental benefits of a single green market for goods 
within the EU (and with hopes for that effort to influence standards beyond the EU borders as 
well). In the first place, harmonisation facilitates the transfer of information to the consumer. 
Consumers faced with a barrage of different claims related to the same green attributes are 
discouraged from exercising their preferences toward green goods, lacking the time and 
inclination to fully understand and compare the various standards. In the same vein a more 
harmonised regime allows for a simpler job of consumer education, which is the foundation on 
which any standards regime must rest. Ultimately consumer labels only work when consumers 
understand their implications and respond in the marketplace. 
As such the main positive impact of a harmonised regime of product environmental footprinting 
would be greater ability for green goods to find buyers. It was noted above that there is a 
substantial appetite on the part of consumers in OECD markets (and growing appetite in 
emerging markets) for more information as to the environmental implications of purchased 
goods, with a seeming particular preference for information in the foods sector.  
A related environmental benefit to a harmonised approach to PEF is that it eliminates the ability 
for firms to proffer false and misleading claims about the environmental attributes of their 
products. By standardising the meaning of marketing terms such as ‘green,’ ‘biodegradable,’ a 
harmonised approach reinforces the trust that is a necessary prerequisite to a broader 
consumer uptake of green products. 
 Summary of impacts 
Table 3 summarizes the major impacts found across the three cases surveyed above. In many 
cases the impacts are common across two or all three of them, though the specifics may differ 
markedly. Where an impact is specific to a particular case, this is noted. 
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Table 3: Summary of Impacts 
 Mitigation of impacts of food labelling 
The preceding analysis surveys the impacts, both positive and negative, of a variety of types of 
labelling regimes, in a variety of contexts. Most of those impacts are positive, and this is to be 
expected given the public welfare objectives that impel the underlying policies. But there were 
also several negative impacts – for the most part unforeseen – that accompany the surveyed 
labels. 
This section assesses how those negative impacts are being mitigated, and considers what 
additional sorts of mitigation policies might be appropriate. It is primarily aimed at the standard 
setters -- those who are charged with creating climate-related policies. For those policy-makers, 
this section asks the question: what parallel measures are being taken, or might be taken, either 
 Economic Social Environmental 
Positive 
Premiums paid to 
certified producers 
Human health (good 
agricultural practices in 
managing chemicals) 
Climate change benefits 
(intended impacts): less 
deforestation, more efficient 
production process 
Market share, secured 
market access, reduced 
costs of market access 
Gender – empowerment 
from management 
training (cocoa) 
Increased biodiversity from 
reduced forest clearing 
(cocoa, palm oil) 
Increased productivity, 
product quality, 
management practices 
(as side effects of labeling 
demands) 
Reduced child labour 
(cocoa) 
More efficient use of 
environmentally harmful 
inputs 
Increased producer 
incomes from 
productivity 
Preserves market share 
for labour-intensive 
practice (palm oil) 
Negative 
Loss of income and/or 
market share for those 
producers that can’t 
meet the standard; more 
serious a problem if the 
standard is mandatory, or 
in widespread use 
Standards inherently 
disfavour small 
producers: higher per 
unit costs of compliance, 
and buyers often favour 
larger producers 
Credibility, impact problems 
if the system is gamed 
Higher prices of labeled 
goods for consumers 
More extensive land use if 
alternatives are promoted 
(palm oil) 
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by the standard-setting authorities themselves or by other bodies acting in concert with them, 
to mitigate the negative impacts that might be expected? 
Often (but not always) the suggested additional mitigation measures will come with costs 
attached.  Where such costs exist, as a supplementary question this section asks who might be 
engaged in supporting them. 
 Disproportionate impacts on SMEs 
A common theme running through the various cases surveyed above was the disproportionate 
difficulty that standards pose for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). For one thing, it 
was noted that there are fixed costs to obtaining information on the standard, learning how to 
adapt current production and management practices to comply, and then doing so on an 
ongoing basis. The smaller the operation, the more difficult it is to spread those fixed costs over 
the revenue streams, to the point where it is impossible for individual smallholder producers in 
the cocoa and palm oil sectors, for example, to do so alone. 
For another thing, standards that force buyers to ensure the compliance of their primary 
producers tend to pose difficulties for those buyers, for whom training and quality assurance 
may not be core competencies.  The tendency is to push the structure of the value chain toward 
vertical integration, under which the producer and the buyer are seamlessly integrated and 
compliance is easier to assure. This is arguably not as desirable an outcome from the 
perspective of poverty alleviation as the self-employed smallholder or the SME. 
In either case beneficial environmental outcomes are accompanied by undesirable social and 
economic outcomes. There are a number of ways in which those undesirable outcomes can be 
mitigated: 
Existing measures: training, capacity building.  The cases of cocoa and palm oil clearly 
demonstrate the critical value of outside trainers acting to help bring small producers up to a 
state of compliance. Where the producers are small enough to warrant, they typically organise 
into cooperative groups that jointly seek such expertise. In the cases surveyed above, that 
organisation itself had numerous side benefits.  But it almost never happened spontaneously – it 
was initiated by outside actors that understood the potential for standards compliance: buyers, 
NGOs, aid agencies. Similarly, even where the producers are large enough not to need to group 
up, they may be too small to understand the costs and benefits of standards compliance without 
outside counsel. 
In the cases surveyed, these sorts of measures were highly effective at allowing smaller 
producers to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the various standards and labels. 
Without them, there arguably would have been no such participation, and the only standard-
compliant production would take place in large plantations. 
As noted above, the impacts of these efforts go beyond merely allowing producers to meet the 
standards. They also lead to higher productivity, higher incomes and safer use of chemicals 
through good agricultural practice, for example. 
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Where should the funds come from for such efforts? If certification earns the producer a 
premium, then part of that premium can be devoted to the training and capacity building. But 
initial funding will need to come from outside sources, since premiums arrive only after much of 
the training is done. That initial funding, and any supplements necessary over and above what 
can be bought with the premiums, should come from the government propounding the 
standard, if it is a government standard. The World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) TBT 
Agreement stops short of requiring this of members that create standards.  Article 12.7 does 
bind members to: 
“…provide technical assistance to developing country Members to ensure that 
the preparation and application of technical regulations, standards and 
conformity assessment procedures do not create unnecessary obstacles to the 
expansion and diversification of exports from developing country Members.” 
But that obligation is compromised by the allowance that any such assistance should be 
arranged “on mutually agreed terms and conditions.”24 That said, given the potential negative 
effects of climate-related standards, those terms and conditions should be generous. 
Where the standard is not a government standard, assistance could (and does) come from aid 
agencies, NGOs, or from international sources such as development banks, or 
intergovernmental agencies such as the International Trade Centre (ITC) or the Global 
Environment Fund. There may also be a role for the UNFCCC to support developing country 
producer efforts to comply with climate-related standards, using vehicles such as the Green 
Climate Fund; often the final results will achieve objectives in the areas of mitigation, adaptation 
and economic diversification. 
Existing measures: RSPO Smallholder Support Fund. Recognising the special challenges faced 
by smallholders (defined as 50 hectares or less) in the palm oil sector seeking to produce 
sustainably, the RSPO in 2013 launched its Smallholder Support Fund, to which smallholders can 
apply for assistance in getting certified.  The Fund is built through a 10% levy on RSPO income 
from CSPO sales, as well as a dedication of 50% of surplus income. As of February 2014 the Fund 
stood at $1.25 million. 
The process of RSPO certification takes on average one to three years, and smallholders can 
apply for support up to $100,000 per year for a maximum of three years.  Support can go to 
training on agricultural practices, conservation activities, social development, market access and 
organisational growth, and/or can cover auditing costs. The funds must be matched by another 
sponsor, typically a product manufacturer or retailer. 
Possible additional measures: special facilities for SMEs. Along the lines of the RSPO special 
fund for smallholders, there might also be special rules and institutions for SMEs. In the same 
way that the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) offers a simplified procedure for small 
projects, the standards might offer simplified verification and other procedures tailored for 
                                                          
24 The Article 12.7 obligation is accompanied by the requirement that it be carried out in accordance with 
the provisions of Article 11.  The need for mutual agreement on the terms and conditions of support is a 
hallmark of almost all the Article 11 obligations. 
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smaller producers, at least in their initial years of certification. Special provision might be made 
for group certification, in ways that bring down costs for individual producers. 
Possible additional measures: no mandatory standards without universal assistance, demand 
stimulation. It was noted above that the impacts of mandatory standards are different from 
those of voluntary standards. The former, if they have high enough negative impacts, can simply 
be ignored by producers who prefer to supply the conventional (un-certified) segment of the 
market. The latter do not allow this strategy, shutting off market access for non-certified 
producers. This effectively amplifies the duress for small producers who, as noted above, may 
face higher per unit costs, and would probably be among those pursuing conventional markets 
were they available. In light of these dynamics, one possible additional policy would be an 
undertaking that any mandatory climate-related standards will be accompanied by mechanisms 
to distribute training and capacity building assistance to any producer that requests it.  
In a similar vein, any mandatory standards might be accompanied by efforts by the 
implementing country to stimulate demand for the labelled products, and a system of education 
for consumers, so that demand does not diminish in the face of any price increases. 
 Harmonisation of standards 
There is a seemingly straightforward solution to the problem of a proliferating field of standards 
covering the same attributes: harmonisation. In practice, however, harmonisation is anything 
but straightforward. Different jurisdictions may have fundamentally different starting points and 
objectives when regulating, even on the same subject matter, and the final shape of the 
regulations reflects that. 
Existing measures: EU PEF.  Efforts such as the EU’s PEFs are potentially valuable in this regard, 
as they aim to act as market leaders which will eventually have enough critical mass to attract 
users from outside the EU. Even within the EU they have the value of potentially providing a 
single standard to which producers can adhere when selling in any EU member state. This 
lowers costs for producers, and acts to facilitate trade in environmentally preferable products. 
Existing measures: ISEAL Alliance.  The ISEAL Alliance is a non-governmental organisation that 
that strives to bring coherence and effectiveness to the practice of sustainability standards. Its 
stated goals are to improve the impacts and effectiveness of standards, to define credibility for 
sustainability standards, and to increase the uptake of such standards. ISEAL has published three 
codes of good practice as a reference for sustainability standards: 
 Assurance Code: the Code of Good Practice for Assuring Compliance with Social and 
Environmental Standards is aimed at certifiers and accreditation of certifiers. 
 Standard-Setting Code: the Code of Good Practice for Setting Social and Environmental 
Standards defines best practice in creating and implementing standards 
 Impacts Code: the Code of Good Practice for Assessing the Impacts of Social and 
Environmental Standards defines best practice in measuring the effectiveness of 
standards. 
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These practices, if followed, will tend to make it easier for producers to comply with any given 
standard. This is true of the Standard-Setting code in particular, which demands transparency, 
accountability and relevance. 
 Better understanding of the broader impacts 
Ultimately it is impossible to mitigate the negative impacts of climate-related food labels if 
those impacts are not known. Standards bodies should be conducting research along the lines 
surveyed in this paper, trying to discover what sorts of unintended consequences might result 
from their efforts. The scope of research should cover not just environmental impacts, but also 
economic and social.  And it should cover not just national impacts, but international as well. 
This sort of research should be carried out both in the process of propounding the standards, 
and on an ongoing basis, as part of the process of monitoring results and striving for continuous 
improvement. 
An efficient way to better understand these sorts of impacts is to ask affected parties to come 
forward with their input, both during the process of propounding the standards and on an 
ongoing basis.  The EU’s PEF has taken a long and careful tack in engaging a broad range of 
relevant stakeholders in its current phase, though it could do more to reach out to foreign 
producers. On an ongoing basis any standards regime should have a designated point of contact, 
an appellate mechanism, and full transparency of all applicable rules, so as to encourage and 
enable outside input. 
Existing measures: COSA.  COSA (The Committee on Sustainability Assessment) is a non-
governmental organisation dedicated to rigorous assessment of the impacts of sustainability 
standards. They are committed to the ISEAL Impacts Code (see above) which demands, among 
other things, the use of control groups, and making evaluation data available to other 
researchers to facilitate replicability of findings. They evaluate impacts in the economic, social 
and environmental areas. COSA is retained on a consultancy basis, usually by the owner of a 
voluntary sustainability standard, to assess the scheme’s impacts with a view to increasing 
effectiveness and reducing unintended negative effects. UTZ and Rainforest Alliance have used 
COSA repeatedly to conduct public and critical assessments of the impacts of their schemes. 
 Conclusion 
This paper has surveyed the agricultural sector, and specifically food labels, as a case study in 
the broader impacts of climate-related policies. In the end it shows clearly that such policies will 
have impacts not only in their intended target area, but also in other facets of public policy – 
economic, environmental and social.  Beyond the lessons learned specific to the food labelling 
case, the analysis here supports the notion that any climate change policies should be carefully 
assessed for their broader sustainable development impacts, both in their initial elaboration and 
on an ongoing basis. 
The solutions proposed here are good illustrations of the way this approach can lead to broader 
welfare benefits without sacrificing the initial objectives. It is expected that this same basic 
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message will emanate from the other case study efforts conducted under the broader project, 
with lessons applicable to climate policy as a whole. 
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